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Since late September 2014, thousands of protesters have occupied the main 
thoroughfares of Hong Kong and pressed demands for, inter alia, a genuine 
election of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
(“HKSAR”) in 2017.  The police initially responded with tear gas, to which the 
protesters defended themselves with umbrellas, hence giving the movement its 
popular name.  The occupation has lasted for more than a month since then, and 
there is still no sign of resolution.  This article will analyse the causes of this 
movement and offer some thoughts on its implications for Hong Kong and China.   
 
 
 
The Background 
 
The campaign for democracy in Hong Kong has a long history.  It can be traced 
back to the abortive Political Reform undertaken under colonial era by Governor 
Mark Young in the 1950s.  Whereas Britain has adopted a fairly standard package 
of democratic reform for most of her colonies in the process leading to 
decolonization, no major constitutional reform was introduced in Hong Kong after 
the War and any attempt to do so was abandoned due to strong opposition both 
from the business sector in Hong Kong and from Beijing.1  
 
The push for democracy regained momentum in the early 1980s and sparked into 
a full-fledged movement soon after the ratification of the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration under which Hong Kong was to be returned to China and would 
become a Special Administrative Region on 1 July 1997. Since the mid-eighties, 
the pace and scale of the democratic movement has consistently been on the 
political agenda in Hong Kong. 
 
Between 1985 and 1987, there were strong public demands for the introduction of 
direct election to the Legislative Council (“LegCo”). The earliest possible 
occasion was 1988, but the call for direct elections was rejected by the then 
British government in 1987, allegedly due to strong opposition from China, on the 
                                                        * I am grateful to the helpful comments of Professor Jacques deLisle on an earlier draft of this article.  This is an expanded version of an earlier public speech given at the University of Pennsylvania. 1 See Steve Tsang, Government and Politics (Hong Kong University Press, 1995), pp 82, 125; Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong (I B Tauris, 2007), p 208, and New York Times, 29 Oct 2014. 
 2 
grounds that the Basic Law was still in the process of drafting, and that any 
democracy in Hong Kong should be given by the Chinese and not by the British. 
 
The public then turned its mind to the next legislative elections in 1991.  As a 
result of the 1989 suppression of student movement at Tiananmen in Beijing, the 
Hong Kong Government, probably with the tacit agreement of China, agreed to 
introduce direct election for 18 out of 60 seats in LegCo in 1991. This was the 
first time direct election to the LegCo was introduced in Hong Kong, albeit for 
less than one-third of its members. 
 
Since then, the directly elected component has increased, but today still only 50% 
of the members of LegCo are returned by direct election from geographic 
constituencies.  The remaining half of the members come from “functional 
constituencies”, which comprise of a very small number of voters and represent 
largely large business sectors.   
 
Broadly speaking, the political spectrum in Hong Kong can be divided into two 
major camps: the pro-establishment camp and the pan-democrats.  For most of the 
geographic elections, the pan-democrats have until recently consistently secured 
about 60% of the popular vote.  Yet due to the composition of the LegCo, they 
represent less than 30% of the votes in the Legislature.  Pro-establishment 
candidates consistently win the majority of the seats returned by “functional 
constituencies”.  The split vote system, under which any bills or amendments or 
motion debates sponsored by individual members could only be passed by a 
majority of each of the two constituencies in the LegCo as opposed to a simple 
majority of the whole house for Government-sponsored bills, further diminishes 
the influence of the popularly elected members. 
 
While there have been some democratic reforms to the process for selecting the 
legislature over the years, the same had not been true for the powerful head of 
Hong Kong’s government.  Before 1997, the Governor of Hong Kong was always 
appointed by London.  After Hong Kong’s return to China in 1997, the Chief 
Executive (“CE”) was to be selected by a small group, the Election Committee, 
which has increased its size from 400 for the first term to 1,200 for the third term.  
The Election Committee is comprised largely of representatives of different 
functional groups—essentially the functional constituencies for LegCo 
elections—with a relatively small number of constituents and a strong bias in 
favor of the business and pro-China factions.   
 
Thus, Hong Kong has a strange political system. Those who are in power have no 
popular mandate, and those who have a popular mandate have no power.  Not 
surprisingly, democracy and accountability have continued to dominate the 
political agenda well after the changeover to Chinese rule.  
 
 
Promises in the Basic Law 
 
The Basic Law, which was promulgated in 1990, provides that the ultimate aim is 
to have a fully elected LegCo and a CE returned by universal suffrage.  It then sets 
out the composition and the selection process for the first three terms of the 
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LegCo and the CE after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative in 1997, and further provides that the method of 
formation/selection could be changed after the third term if there is a need to 
change.  It is for the Central Government in Beijing to determine if there is such a 
need.  Thus, the earliest possible time for any change under the Basic Law was in 
the third term, that is, around 2005. 
 
While there were continuous campaigns t o bring forward the realization of the 
ultimate goal of having full direct election for both the LegCo and the CE in the 
2000s, the Central Government has repeatedly decided that there was no need to 
change the method of selection of the LegCo and CE.   This has become a thorny 
issue every time there was an election.  Hopes for relatively quick progress to 
fully democratic elections have been disappointed.  Small progress has, however, 
been made. 
 
In December 2007, the NPCSC ruled out direct elections for 2012, but it also 
unexpectedly stated in its decision that there might be direct election of the CE in 
2017 and thereafter for the LegCo, which means 2020 at the earliest.  To many 
people this was a great disappointment, as there would be no full direct election 
until twenty years after the changeover.  Nonetheless, for the first time there was a 
timetable. 
 
In 2012, C.Y. Leung, who was the second choice of Beijing, surprisingly won the 
election after scandal-damaged Beijing’s initially preferred candidate.  Leung won 
with a bare majority of 689 votes from the 1,200 member Election Committee.  
His small mandate once again highlighted the unsatisfactory nature of the Election 
Committee. 
 
 
The 2017 Election of the Chief Executive 
 
Since 2012, the focus of the community has been on the 2017 election of the CE.  
The main issue is the nomination process, as under Art 45 of the Basic Law, the 
CE “shall be elected by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly 
representative nomination committee in accordance with a democratic process.”  
The main questions are: What is a broadly representative nomination committee?  
What constitutes a democratic process? Can nominations be made other than by 
the nomination committee? 
 
These issues turned out to be highly charged.  The Hong Kong community has 
become highly divided and polarized, especially during the months preceding the 
NPCSC’s August 31, 2014 decision concerning the process for nominating CE 
candidates.  At one end of the spectrum, the conservatives wanted to keep the 
Election Committee from the previous CE election cycles as the nomination 
committee for the 2017 election and even raise the threshold for nomination 
(which had been well below half of the committee in previous cycles).  At the 
other end of the spectrum, many people have no confidence in the Election 
Committee model.  So they advocated for civic nomination, that is, a person who 
has secured a certain amount of popular endorsement from the voters shall 
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become a candidate.  Another proposal was to have nomination by political parties 
that will have secured a certain percentage of votes in the LegCo election in 2016. 
 
The Hong Kong government began a consultation process in December 2013, 
which was concluded in May 2014.  During the consultation period, the Central 
Government in Beijing made it clear that the CE has to be “patriotic,” that the 
nomination has to be made by the nomination committee and not any other body 
(thereby excluding civic nomination), and that the nomination committee’s 
composition should be modeled after the Election Committee, notably keeping the 
Election Committee’s structure of four equally represented sectors (industrial, 
commercial and financial, the professions, labor, social services, religious and 
other, and current and former political officeholders) that generally track the 
functional constituencies for LegCo. 
 
While the composition of the Election Committee appears at its face value broadly 
representative, this is far from the case.  Apart from the 39 members of the LegCo 
who are returned by universal suffrage, the remaining members of the Election 
Committee are returned by a small number of voters.  The size of the voters of 
each subsector is an average about 1,000, making a total size of the voters less 
than 240,000.  Many of the subsectors comprise only corporate voters, or a 
majority of corporate voters, and the criteria to become a voter are entirely 
unclear.  Thus, for example, the Fisheries and Agricultural subsector returns a 
total of 60 members to the Election Committee.  The subsector comprises about 
83 voters, all of whom are organizations. Many may look to have the same or very 
similar memberships, such as Aberdeen Fisherman Friendship Association, 
Aberdeen Fisherwomen Association, Hong Kong Fishermen’s Association and 
Hong Kong and Kowloon Fishermen Association Ltd. There is no clear procedure 
of how an organization becomes a voter.  Thus, it comes as no surprise that there 
is no confidence that this body would be representative and would make a 
nomination that could represent the general view of the public.  The contrive 
membership also means that it could easily be manipulated. 
 
While not everyone supports the proposal of civic nomination, it is fair to say that 
there is a fair amount of consensus in the Hong Kong community that political 
screening at the nomination stage is unacceptable.  Civic nomination was initially 
perceived to be a negotiation tactic.  However, as time passed, it has become a 
principle in itself.  It is also a commonly held view that if there were no genuine 
election in 2017, Hong Kong would become ungovernable given the level of 
public expectation for a genuine election. 
 
Thus, during the consultation process, there were the moderates who accepted the 
principle that there should not be unreasonable restrictions on nomination, but 
considered that this could be achieved within the parameters set by the Central 
Government in Beijing without recourse to civic nomination or political party 
nomination.  Many also recognized that the way forward has to be to forge some 
consensus between the moderate faction of the pan-democrats and the liberal 
faction of the pro-establishment group.  By the end of the consultation period in 
May 2014, there were no fewer than ten different proposals which could broadly 
be described as falling within this moderate middle ground.  While some of them 
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are fairly promising or innovative, none of them has been seriously examined by 
the public.   
 
 
The Occupy Central Movement 
 
At the same time, at around the end of the year 2012, Law Professor Benny Tai of 
the University of Hong Kong, along with two others, started the Occupy Central 
Movement.  They were worried that the eventual model for selecting CE 
nominees would be a conservative model with political screening, and they 
wanted a model without unreasonable restrictions to be in place for 2017.  Benny 
Tai and other of his generation started campaigning for democracy in HK since he 
was a young university student.  He is now in his mid-50s and is still campaigning 
for democracy.  To some extent, he represents a group that sees itself as having 
waited for long enough. Their patience is running out. 
 
Occupy Central—with “Central” being the name for the area in Hong Kong that is 
at the heart of the financial district and adjacent to key government offices—was 
intended to be a movement of civil disobedience.  Tai and other Occupy Central 
leaders have advocated for a peaceful movement.  “Occupy” is also intended to be 
the last resort.  Following Tai’s plan, there were to be five rounds of civil 
discourse on various political models, and at the end the participants would make 
an informed choice of one of the models proposed by the community.  They 
would then adopt that model as a benchmark to measure against the model that the 
Hong Kong Government eventually propose, and would conduct a popular poll 
(or referendum) to decide if the government’s proposal was acceptable.  If not, 
and if Tai’s group had the popular mandate to go ahead, then, and only then, 
would they move to Occupy Central as a last resort. 
 
In light of its destructive nature, Occupy Central is controversial in Hong Kong, 
even among the pan-democrats.  Yet it did open up a window for the moderates to 
seek a middle ground.  Unfortunately, things did not turn out as planned.  In June 
2014, after the completion of the consultation process by the Hong Kong 
Government, Benny Tai decided to put the fifteen models that had been proposed 
to a vote among those who had participated in the previous rounds of “civil 
discourse”, with a view to selecting three models for popular vote.  Unfortunately, 
all three models that were chosen included an element of “civic nomination,” thus 
leaving the public who wanted to participate in the unofficial balloting with no 
choice but to vote in favor of civic nomination (or not to vote at all).  The process 
was subject to widespread criticisms from left, right and centre, charging that the 
process that limited the public to a choice among three similar models itself was 
an example of “political screening” that Tai and others had condemned as a flaw 
of any nomination process that did not allow for civic nomination.  Support for 
Occupy Central was at its lowest at that time. 
 
 
A Turning Point: The Central Government’s White Paper 
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Then the Central Government published a White Paper on Hong Kong.2  Unlike 
Beijing’s previous stance, the tone of the White Paper is very much that the extent 
of autonomy is the extent that the Central Government is prepared to tolerate.  The 
White Paper also includes a controversial part stating that judges, being part of the 
administration, have to be patriotic.  To be fair, there is nothing of substance that 
is new in the White Paper.  But the concern in Hong Kong was not the content but 
the way the message was conveyed. 
 
The White Paper sparked widespread criticisms and worries in Hong Kong, 
especially because it touches upon basic values such as the rule of law and the 
independence of the judiciary.  This has resurrected popular support for Occupy 
Central.  In late June, when Occupy Central put forward the three chosen 
proposals for popular voting, about 800,000 people turned out to vote.  This 
turnout was all the more impressive because it occurred despite various attempts 
to jam the computers through which participants voted in the online poll, and 
political threat about the consequences for Hong Kong of even an unofficial 
referendum calling for political change that Beijing would not accept.  The 
unexpectedly large turnout gave a new push and strong legitimacy for the claim 
for civic nomination, thanks to the Central Government. 
 
 
The NPCSC Decision 
 
The CE submitted his report on the Hong Kong Government’s consultation 
process to the NPCSC in July 2014.  At the end of August, the NPCSC decided 
that the composition, the number of members and the method of formation of the 
Nomination Committee for 2017 will be the same as (and not just designed with 
reference to) the Election Committee in 2012, and each candidate shall need the 
endorsement of over 50% of the members of the Nomination Committee, which is 
much higher than the 12.5% that was adopted for nomination in the previous 
Election Committee. 
 
This NPCSC decision is more conservative than the community had expected.  
Not only does it exclude any possibility that a candidate favored by the pan-
democrats will be successfully nominated, it also leaves little room for the middle 
ground options that had been discussed in Hong Kong during 2013 and earlier in 
2014.  The NPCSC decision leaves the pan-democrats with limited choices: either 
use their representation in LegCo to vote down the electoral legislation that the 
Hong Kong Government would introduce to implement the NPCSC decision 
(something the pan-democrats could do if they stuck together because the 
legislation will need a 2/3 majority in LegCo to pass the proposal for 
constitutional reform), or to take the issue to the streets.   
 
                                                        2 PRC, White Paper on The Practice of the “One Country, Two Systems” Policy in the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (State Council, the People’s Republic of China, 10 June 2014), http://www.fmcoprc.gov.hk/eng/xwdt/gsxw/t1164057.htm.  
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The Hong Kong Government’s plan apparently was to make use of the time 
before the proposal is to be voted by the LegCo to divide the pan-democrats.  All 
that the government would need is about five defections among the pan-democrat 
legislators to secure the requisite 2/3 majority. 
 
 
The Occupation 
 
Following the NPCSC decision, dissatisfaction continued to build up in Hong 
Kong.  In late September, students started a boycott of classes. They started to 
demonstrate outside the Government headquarters at Queensway, and as the 
demonstration gathered momentum and support, they asked where the Occupy 
Central people were.  By the end of the first week of the boycott, at the end of 
September, Benny Tai and his group had no choice but to announce bringing 
forward the date of Occupy Central to join the student protestors. 
 
When “Occupy” started, the police tried to contain the initial group of 
demonstrators and to stop other people from joining, but this led to even more 
people coming to surround the police.  Very soon the protestors spread to occupy 
the main roads.  When police started using tear gas, somewhat indiscriminately, 
against the protestors, this has brought even more people to support the students, 
and the protestors’ use of umbrellas to deflect pepper spray gave the movement its 
popular name.  Very soon, instead of occupying just Central, people started 
occupying the shopping districts at Causeway Bay and Mongkok, and some called 
the movement Occupy Hong Kong.  It had soon become clear that no one person 
or organization is or could be in control of the movement any longer. 
 
The students, who are at the forefront of the movement, want NPCSC to withdraw 
its August decision, to re-start the consultation process and to allow civic 
nomination.  After the use of tear gas by the police, they also called for the 
resignation of the CE.  In reply, the government took a firm stance that the 
electoral process has to comply with the Basic Law, meaning no civic nomination. 
At the same time, the police have adopted a more conciliating attitude and did not 
make any serious attempts to clear the protestors from the occupied areas. 
 
As the occupation entered its second and third weeks, the blockage of the main 
roads had caused considerable inconvenience to the public, and there was an 
increasing sense of dissatisfaction among the public who are affected.  Some 
resorted to self-help and ended up in confrontations with the protestors.  There 
was also the so-called Anti-Occupy Central Group, which was formed earlier in 
the year to countenance the Occupy Central Group and which was believed to be 
heavily financed by the Central Government.  There were various violent 
confrontations between the protestors and the Anti-Occupy Central Group, and the 
Government was accused of not attempting to stop the violent behavior of the 
Anti-Occupy Central Group or their supporters. The Government at first agreed to 
hold talks with the students on 13 Oct 2014, but it unilaterally cancelled the talk at 
the last minute.   
 
As public dissatisfaction of the inconvenience caused by the occupation of major 
thoroughfares continued to grow, the police have successfully removed the 
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barricades without meeting serious resistance.  Yet the protestors very soon 
returned to the occupied areas. 
 
On 21 October, the Government finally met with the students, who made four 
demands: (1) withdrawal of the NPCSC decision in August 2014; (2) endorsing 
civic nomination for the election of the CE; (3) abolition of functional 
constituencies; and (4) a clear timetable to achieve these objectives. There was no 
longer a call for the resignation of the CE, though the demand for abolition of 
functional constituencies was newly added (although this issue has been a long 
standing issue in the democratic reform of the LegCo).  In response, the 
Government offered to submit a report to the Central Government setting out in an 
impartial manner the public sentiment that was expressed after the NPCSC 
decision in August 2014, and undertook to maximize the scope of representation 
in the Nomination Committee in the further round of consultation.  It also offered 
to continue the dialogue and assured the protestors that the Government would 
continue to work towards further constitutional reform after 2017.  The 
Government responses were rejected by the students as being too vague and non-
committing, and they decided to stay in the occupied areas. 
 
At the same time, some pro-China groups successfully obtained an injunction 
order from the High Court compelling the protesters to clear the occupied areas.  
The protesters refused to comply with the injunction order, and were criticized for 
endangering the rule of law.  The Government has not taken any action to enforce 
the injunction order, at least not until the court has authorized the police to enforce 
the civil injunction order.  At the end of October, Benny Tai decided to return to 
the University to resume his teaching, whereas the students planned to petition the 
Central Government during the Asia-Pacific Economic Pact meeting in 
November.  Some members of the pan-democrats also proposed to urge a few 
elected members of the LegCo to resign and try to get elected again on a single 
issue platform of nomination as a form of referendum, a controversial move that 
they have adopted a few years ago. 
 
 
At the Crossroads 
 
Since the third week of the occupation, there was a bit of a stalemate and growing 
fatigue among both the protestors and the wider community.  It is difficult to 
sustain a movement by continuous blockage of main roads, as the inconvenience 
to the public means that the movement is losing popular support.  The protesters’ 
refusal to comply with the injunction order of the court has also attracted criticism 
from those who sympathize with them, as it is considered to be a blatant denial of 
the rule of law. The protesters demand civic nomination, which the Central 
Government would not accept and which the Hong Kong Government has no 
power to agree.  On the other hand, it is difficult for the students just to retreat 
empty-handed, and repeated calls for their retreat are likely to be futile.  Unless 
the protesters are willing to back down from their demands or they are offered at 
least something so that they are able to find an opportune excuse to retreat, it is 
likely that they would continue to stay at the occupied areas. 
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On the part of the Hong Kong Government, its hands are tied.  The political 
reform is basically decided by the Central Government.  The occupation has 
caused considerable inconvenience to the community and begun to have an impact 
on the economy.  The Government’s choice has been either to use force to clear 
the site at some point, or to talk out the protestors.  Yet any attempt to use force to 
disperse the protestors would predictably incite more public support for the 
movement.  It is clear that the Government could not accede to the demands of the 
students/protesters and its tactic at some point was to drag on so as to wear out the 
protesters, especially when public dissatisfaction was growing.  The Government 
could have played a more active role as a mediator between the students/protesters 
and the Central Government, but it seems to be hesitant to take up such a role. 
 
Beijing has condemned the movement.  It has not helped that the movement 
sometimes has been called the “Umbrella Revolution”.  “Revolution” touches a 
nerve in Beijing, where wariness of the “color revolutions” elsewhere remains 
strong.  Beijing has accused foreign powers, notably the United States, of being 
behind the movement.  Since mid-June, Beijing has raised the level of concern 
about the unrest in Hong Kong to be one of “national security.”  Thus, for Beijing, 
Occupy in Hong Kong is not about democracy but national security, although 
suppressing the movement by the People’s Liberation Army is apparently not on 
the agenda of the Beijing leaders, as first this is unnecessary since any forceful 
suppression could be done by the police in Hong Kong, and secondly such move 
would create more problems than it could have solved.  
 
How will the movement unfold?  Even if the students were prepared to retreat, the 
root causes leading to the occupation would not be resolved.  On the face of it, the 
immediate triggering factor is the NPCSC Decision in August imposing a 
restrictive nomination regime.  Deep down, for some of the protesters, there is 
frustration that they have been campaigning for democracy for over 30 years and 
they are not prepared to wait any longer.  For some, they want to be in greater 
control of their lives at a time when things seem desperate for them, especially 
their economic prospects.  Property prices have gone up, the gap between the rich 
and the poor keeps widening, and the prospects for high-paying employment have 
dimmed, leaving many young people with little hope for their future.  For some, it 
is frustration with the incompetence of the government generally or with the CE 
himself, who has been plagued with scandals after scandals (including a recently 
exposed, previously secret multi-million dollar payment from an Australian 
company before he became CE) and a political tin ear (including a recent 
interview in which he opposed full democracy in Hong Kong because it would 
give the vote to poorer people who demand more generous social welfare 
policies).  These issues have to be addressed. 
 
Despite the discontent in Hong Kong, Beijing is unlikely to change its decision.  
Its concern is, rightly or wrongly, stability in Hong Kong and foreign interference 
in Hong Kong.  Stability is at the forefront of the mind of the Chinese leadership.  
At a deeper level, the issue of democracy in Hong Kong goes to what Beijing 
understands to be the meaning of the promised “high degree of autonomy” for 
Hong Kong.  The Joint Declaration is, for Beijing, a unilateral announcement of 
its policies towards Hong Kong and not an agreement, as such, with Britain.  
Therefore, any foreign comments or interference with Hong Kong’s affairs is an 
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interference with China’s domestic affairs.  Beijing’s approach to the Basic Law is 
both historical (it has given more than what the British had given when they ruled 
Hong Kong) and political (the Basic Law has to be construed and understood in a 
way to serve the wider political ends of maintaining stability and prosperity).  
Liberal democracy as understood in the Western sense was never part of the 
promise in Beijing’s view.  Democracy is tolerated only to the extent that it is 
necessary to sustain the prosperity and stability in Hong Kong.  Beijing’s 
understanding of autonomy is that Beijing will not send its own cadres to rule 
Hong Kong, but Hong Kong has to be run by someone from Hong Kong whom 
Beijing trusts.  This is the price for Beijing’s granting Hong Kong a high degree 
of autonomy.  Election has to be a process in which Beijing will know the 
outcome before the ballots are cast.  Unfortunately, this is a contradiction in 
terms, and it has meant a sharp divergence in the understanding of the Joint 
Declaration and the Basic Law between the Central Government and the people in 
Hong Kong. 
 
The Hong Kong Government’s hands are tied, but it does not mean that there is 
nothing the government can do.  Yet it has so far shown a singular lack of 
leadership or moral courage.  It has been suspected that the Central Government 
does not have a full picture of the sentiment in Hong Kong, and its repeated 
statements of foreign interference and Hong Kong trying to gain independence are 
entirely out of touch with the reality in Hong Kong.  Thus, the Government’s offer 
to submit a report to the Central Government setting out fully and impartially the 
public sentiment since August 2014 is a positive step, albeit a step too little too 
late.  While Beijing is unlikely to change the framework of its August decision, 
could modifications of some part of its decision, such as lowering the threshold 
from the proposed 50% to the previous 12.5%, coupled with other promises to 
widen the representation of the Nomination Committee, be a way out?  At the 
very least, could a meeting be arranged between leaders of the Central 
Government and the students as a means to provide students with an excuse to 
retreat from the occupied area?  However, these could only be achieved if the 
Hong Kong Government, and those who have the ears of Beijing, is prepared to 
persuade the Beijing leaders, and this is not forthcoming.  Further dialogues with 
the protesters are essential, but unless both sides are prepared to work harder and 
to compromise, such dialogues would unlikely lead to any fruitful result. 
 
Thus, we are now at a deadlock and a crossroads.  The Chinese propaganda has 
described the movement as a “riot”,3 the same term that it used to describe the 
Tiananmen event in 1989 in April that year.  Would there be a peaceful solution, 
or would it end up as another bloody and violent page in history?  Only history 
could tell, but at this stage, there is little cause for optimism.     
                                                        3 Global Times, 13 Oct 2014. 
